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https://afreeretriever.wordpress.com/portfolio/arezzo-meeting-2024-on-the-revolutionary-subject-the-balance-of-class-forces/3/
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On the shift of capitalism’s center of gravity towards Asia in particular.
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On a good understanding of capitalist development in Asia.
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And, on a virtual lack of appreciation of the class struggle in this region. (1)
Shifting capitalism’s center of gravity
This shift of capitalism’s center of gravity is spectacular if we compare the evolution of the share of the ‘historical’ developed countries with that of the emerging + developing countries, calculated in purchasing power parity: (2)
This geographical shift of capitalism’s center of gravity mainly concerns Asia, where the economic dynamic has overtaken that of the West in terms of GDP (Graph 2) :
This shift is even more spectacular if we focus on manufacturing production alone: only a quarter of a century ago, the G7 still accounted for two-thirds of manufacturing production, against one-tenth in Asia, whereas today the G7 accounts for only half (one-third in 2024), against more than 40% in Asia:
As a result, not only has the heart of capitalism moved to Asia, but so have the main strongholds of the world proletariat since 3/5 of the manufacturing proletariat working on assembly lines are found there … and the Communist Left has not yet taken the full measure of this, either economically or politically and even less so socially!!!!
Towards a global appreciation of the class balance of forces
Therefor, assessing the state of the class balance of forces at world level requires, at the very least, an analysis of the state of the class struggle in Asia! And this analysis is important for two reasons: to appreciate the capacity of the proletariat to make revolution at world level, but also to appreciate its capacity to resist a war recruitment, from both Beijing and Washington. Below, we put forward some general characteristics which should play a part in this assessment. Still too lapidary, they need to be completed and critically discussed.
* As well as being numerically large and young, the proletariat in Asia is also highly concentrated, unlike anything we have seen in the West … think of the 450,000 employees at the Foxconn industrial site in Shenzhen!
* It’s also an essentially manufacturing proletariat, working on assembly lines, which has only slightly been affected by the tertiarization–fragmentation phenomenon.
* If the scant information available is to be believed, it is also a proletariat which is still combative (Graphs 4 & 5) and which has not been affected by the profound decline of the Western proletariat over the last half-century (Graph 6).
* Finally, the working class in Asia is much better educated and concentrated and lives in a much more developed society than that of Russia in October 1917 (where the proletariat was a minority in a society that was still largely agricultural).
* The proletariat in Asia has little historical experience and still has many illusions about democracy, ’free’ trade unions, the pursuit of economic prosperity…, particularly in China, but not only.
Nevertheless, our feeling is that, despite these undeniable negative factors, they do not wipe out the enormous revolutionary potential of this industrial proletariat, which is numerous, concentrated, educated and combative. As in the case of the proletariat in Russia in 1917, its youth and the lack of influence of a reformist social democracy, as in the West, could even make it an asset. Admittedly, this fraction of the world proletariat will need the contribution of the experiences of its historical sectors (just as the revolution in Russia needed its extension to the West), but its weaknesses must not be overestimated.
The geo-economic and imperialist tilting of the world around the China-USA bipolarization confers a new responsibility on the proletariat of these two great powers, all the more so as the proletariat in Europe has suffered a profound retreat of more than half a century (Graph 6). (3) What’s more, this ’historic’ proletariat of Western Europe finds itself terribly weakened and in a less central position than before, squeezed as it is, economically, socially and politically, between these two powers, the United States and China. On the other hand, the proletariat of these two superpowers is characterized by two historical weaknesses: (1) although for different reasons, it is bathed in a viscerally ’anti-communist’ atmosphere and (2) it has historically contributed little to the international workers’ movement.
Is there an ‘historical awakening of the class struggle’ (ICC)?
The consequences of the pandemic period (shortages, unemployment, etc.) relayed by those of the war in Ukraine (inflation, etc.) gave impetus to a surge in class struggles in several countries, a surge that markedly contrasted with the social calm of the previous four or five decades (Graph 6). This upsurge was particularly marked in the United Kingdom, both in terms of duration and intensity (graph 7), and much less so in other countries (see appendix). But can we reasonably speak of a historical revival of the class struggle at international level, as the ICC defends? (5)
Certainly NOT … for the following reasons: This upsurge was limited to only a few countries and it gradually ran out of steam. (6) What’s more, if we take a step back in time, it has to be said that the scale of the movement is relatively small, as shown in the graph above for the country where this upsurge was strongest and longest: the United Kingdom. Finally, in the few other countries cited by the ICC, this increase is either non-existent or barely noticeable (see the appendix).
The modest and limited nature of this upsurge in social fever is understandable when we consider the length and depth of the half-century retreat in social conflict and the ideological disorientation it has caused. This retreat means that the working class is starting from a much lower base, with fewer points of support than ever before: little awareness of a common collective interest in a perspective beyond immediate demands; no or very little tendency to take charge of and self-organize struggles; no clear and shared awareness of the situation and the forces at play; a profound loss of the lessons of past experience which is reflected in a renewed confidence in the unions and even in the political forces of the left; no program or project, however vague; lilliputian and fragmented revolutionary organizations which are content to harp on old obsolete software… Worse still, a lot of illusions and disorientation have accumulated, the result of decades of capitalist ideological bludgeoning, and there is no longer any form of preexisting organizational mediation whatsoever. Given the nature of the setback we’ve experienced over the last half-century, if large-scale struggles were to arise in the West, they would have the enormous task of rebuilding from almost nothing. Everything will have to be worked out on the spot, in movement, with very weak and theoretically unprepared political forces.
And of all these things it lacks, the most decisive and undoubtedly the most difficult are: for the proletariat to re-appropriate its class identity, for a project and program commensurate with the present historical situation to be drawn up and disseminated, and for vanguards capable of analyzing and carrying forward these perspectives to emerge – which is still very far from being the case, unfortunately!
1 The all-time champion of these delays is represented by the International Communist Current (ICC) which took more than four decades before halfheartedly acknowledging Chinese growth. Halfheartedly, because even today it is silent in every language about growth in the rest of Asia. Hardheartedly too, because the ICC denies having underestimated developments in China: only a “a certain schematism, in particular at the level of understanding the manifestations of decadence” is acknowledged (cf. Reply to Ferdinand) … whereas this formidable Asian growth directly contradicts its theory of the ’decadence of capitalism in 1914’ as well as its theoretical bases, namely the ’global saturation of completely ruined markets’.
2 i.e. a more appropriate method of calculation since it is based on local purchasing power and not on exchange rates to convert the respective national GDP’s into a common currency (the dollar) so that they can be added together and compared.
3 We analyzed this profound retreat of the ’Western’ proletariat in detail on pages 9 to 11 of our Thematic Notebook n°3. (French)
4 USA, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Spain, Italy, Norway, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand.
5 Read ‘The significance of the ’summer of anger’ in Britain: The return of the combativity of the world proletariat’ in the ICC’s International Review n°169.
6 Contrary to what the ICC predicted in May 2023 in its Resolution on the International Situation of its 25th Congress: “This development of struggles is not a flash in the pan but possesses a future. It indicates a process of class revival after years of reflux and contains the potential for the recovery of class identity, of the class once again becoming aware of what it is, of the power it has when it enters into struggle. Everything indicates that this class movement, born in Europe, can last a long time and will be repeated in other parts of the world. A new situation is opening up for the class struggle”.